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 A Case for Reforming the Anti-Money Laundering 
Regulatory Regime: How Financial Institutions’ Criminal 
Reporting Duties Have Created an Unfunded Private Police 
Force  
CHRISTOPHER J. WILKES* 
INTRODUCTION 
Under the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 and related anti-money laundering regulations 
promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network (FinCEN), financial institutions, their employees, and many other business 
professionals are expected to report to authorities when they suspect that their 
customers have committed money laundering offenses or other financial crimes.1 
The criminal reporting duties conferred on financial institutions under the Bank 
Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering (BSA/AML) regulatory regime expanded in 
July 2018, when the Customer Due Diligence Rule (“CDD Rule”) came into effect.2 
The CDD Rule closed loopholes in the provisions already in place by requiring 
financial institutions to implement additional procedures for verifying the identities 
of their customers.3 Prior to the CDD Rule, the verification requirements did not 
extend to “shell” companies, which criminals often organize to disguise their 
identities as the true underlying owners.4 The anonymity that shell companies 
provide allows them to launder their illegally gained proceeds into apparently 
legitimate businesses without drawing the attention of law enforcement.5 In addition, 
the CDD Rule requires financial institutions to monitor their customers for changes 
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  1. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 
(1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.); 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov 
/about/history/Pages/fincen.aspx (last updated Nov. 13, 2010) [https://perma.cc/6KJP-K3FC].  
 2. FinCEN Reminds Financial Institutions that the CDD Rule Becomes Effective Today, 
FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (May 11, 2018), https://www.fincen.gov/news/news 
-releases/fincen-reminds-financial-institutions-cdd-rule-becomes-effective-today 
[https://perma.cc/5S2V-8NNG]. The CDD Rule was issued in May 2018. Customer Due 
Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81 Fed. Reg. 29,398 (May 11, 2016) 
(codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024 & 1026). 
 3. 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220 (2019) (establishing the requirements of the Customer 
Identification Program). 
 4. See Louise Story, U.S. Plans to Require Banks to Identify Owners of Shell Companies, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/world/americas/us-plans-to 
-require-banks-to-identify-owners-of-shell-companies.html [https://perma.cc/33VD-NMDU].  
 5. Ed Leefeldt, How “Shell” Companies Launder Dirty Money, CBS NEWS: 
MONEYWATCH (Sept. 8, 2016, 5:30 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-shell 
-companies-launder-dirty-money/ [https://perma.cc/4QLA-4XCD]. 
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in activity that should raise their suspicions of possible criminal activity and trigger 
their reporting duties.6  
Although these developments in the law may be viewed as positive changes, 
federal regulators’ increased reliance on banks to serve as the eyes and ears of law 
enforcement is unusual in that the law traditionally rejects imposing obligations to 
report crimes on private actors.7 Surely, if a financial institution or its employees are 
complicit in a money laundering scheme or actively assist in its commission, they 
may be charged as participants in the offense itself, regardless of their lack of 
involvement in the underlying criminal activity from which the funds were derived.8 
But the reporting laws require more than merely not being part of the problem—
financial institutions have a duty to stay abreast of the emerging methods and trends 
in laundering illegitimate proceeds.9  
Federal regulators have ensured their strict compliance through harsh civil and 
criminal penalties.10 For example, Banamex USA, a subsidiary bank of Citigroup, 
agreed to pay $140 million in 2015 for deficiencies in its BSA/AML compliance 
program.11 Three of the bank’s executives were also fined tens of thousands of 
dollars and effectively barred from the banking industry as a result of the same 
enforcement action.12 The penalty amounted to one-sixth of the bank’s total assets, 
 
 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 64–65. 
 7. See Joshua Dressler, Some Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative) About “Bad Samaritan” 
Laws, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 971, 975 (2000). 
 8. See, e.g., Mathew Paulose Jr., United States v. McDougald: The Anathema to 18 
U.S.C. § 1956 and National Efforts Against Money Laundering, 21 Fordham Int’l L.J. 253, 
253 (1997) (“The investigation involves . . . an inquiry into whether [Citibank] knowingly 
accepted, deposited, and disseminated more than US$100 million in allegedly illegitimate 
income . . . . If the inquiry proves true, the Justice Department will charge Citibank for money 
laundering . . . .”). The consequences for such involvement are severe. For example, a bank 
convicted of money laundering may have its charter terminated, known as the “death penalty,” 
and the government can seize and attach either the laundered money or substitute bank assets 
in forfeiture actions. Whitney Adams, Effective Strategies for Banks in Avoiding Criminal, 
Civil, and Forfeiture Liability in Money Laundering Cases, 44 Ala. L. Rev. 669, 685, 698 
n.199 (1993). 
 9. Adams, supra note 8 at 693.  
 10. Treasury Order 180-01 lists FinCEN’s duties to administer the BSA. Treas. Order 
180-01(3)(a) (July 1, 2014). The BSA established the guidelines for how financial institutions 
are to detect and report money laundering. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–32 (2012). 
 11. Press Release, Citigroup, Inc., Citigroup Statement on Banamex USA (July 22, 2015), 
https://www.citigroup.com/citi/news/2015/150722a.htm [https://perma.cc/CVN3-6NNZ].  
 12. Michael Corkery & Ben Protess, Citigroup Agrees to $97.4 Million Settlement in 
Money Laundering Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2017/05/22/business/dealbook/citigroup-settlement-banamex-usa-inquiry.html 
[https://perma.cc/7G3R-R5PS]. The Treasury Department, through the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office, can bring actions against banking industry officials enjoining them “from participating, 
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of any ‘financial institution’ . . . that is 
located in the United States or conducts business within the United States . . . .” Complaint at 
2, 5, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Haider, No. 14 CV 9987 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2014); see also 31 
U.S.C. § 5320 (2012) (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to bring civil actions in district 
court to enjoin violations or enforce compliance). 
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so it was likely not a coincidence that Citigroup announced its plans to close 
Banamex USA on the same day it shared news of the settlement.13  
Such large penalties are not the exception but the norm, as both the number of 
enforcement actions brought against financial institutions for inadequate BSA/AML 
compliance and the dollar value of the fines have both soared in the past decade.14 
As another example, in 2012, British bank HSBC agreed to a record $1.92 billion 
settlement with U.S. federal and state authorities to avoid a criminal indictment for 
inadequate BSA/AML compliance.15 In light of the law’s historical reluctance to 
criminalize the failure to report crimes, the strictly enforced and costly reporting 
obligations imposed on financial institutions under the BSA/AML regulatory regime 
appear anomalous.16 In effect, the current scheme outsources law enforcement duties 
to private institutions, and it deputizes them as government agents responsible for 
preventing, monitoring, and investigating money laundering crimes.17  
This policy decision raises not only normative questions about whether financial 
institutions ought to bear these duties, and to what extent, but also positive questions 
about the BSA/AML regime’s effectiveness and efficiency in deterring money 
laundering. Industry leaders and lobbyists have increasingly criticized FinCEN for 
providing little guidance on how to comply with BSA/AML reporting requirements, 
and there is evidence suggesting that the benefits of criminal reporting do not 
outweigh the costs of compliance.18 Accordingly, policymakers are under growing 
pressure to adopt reform measures that would shift the costs of the BSA/AML 
regulatory regime to the public sector.19  
 
 
 13. Lanier Saperstein, Geoffrey Sant & Michelle Ng, The Failure of Anti-Money 
Laundering Regulation: Where Is the Cost-Benefit Analysis?, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 
(2015); Press Release, Citigroup, Inc., supra note 11.  
 14. Robert Kim, Feeding the Beasts: Anti-Money Laundering Enforcement in 2009-2016, 
BLOOMBERG BNA: NEWS (July 3, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/banking 
-law/feeding-the-beasts-anti-money-laundering-enforcement-in-2009-2016?context=search 
&index=103 [https://perma.cc/Q475-CZD4]. 
 15. Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, HSBC to Pay $1.92 Billion to Settle Charges 
of Money Laundering, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Dec. 10, 2012, 4:10 PM), 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/hsbc-said-to-near-1-9-billion-settlement-over 
-money-laundering/ [https://perma.cc/6MTM-2XZA].  
 16. To further demonstrate the costs associated with BSA/AML compliance, U.S. firms 
collectively spend $25.3 billion per year on their compliance programs. Press Release, 
LexisNexis Risk Sols., Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Costs U.S. Financial Services 
Firms $25.3 Billion Per Year, According to LexisNexis Risk Solutions (Oct. 10, 2018), 
https://risk.lexisnexis.com/about-us/press-room/press-release/20181010-true-cost-aml 
[https://perma.cc/UWA7-QY7X].  
 17. See Examining the BSA/AML Regulatory Compliance Regime: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,115th Cong. 1 
(2017) (statement of Rep. Blaine Luetkemeyer, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & 
Consumer Credit) [hereinafter Hearing]; A New Paradigm: Redesigning the U.S. AML/CFT 
Framework to Protect National Security and Aid Law Enforcement, THE CLEARING HOUSE 3 
(2017) [hereinafter A New Paradigm]. 
 18. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 17, at 16 (statement of Lloyd DeVaux, President and 
Chief Executive Officer, Sunstate Bank). 
 19. A New Paradigm, supra note 17, at 10–18. 
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In spite of the financial sector’s growing pushback, law enforcement officials 
continue to defend the importance of criminal reporting,20 and as the implementation 
of the new CDD Rule shows, regulators are willing to expand the regime. This begs 
another question: if their claims about the value of the information in financial 
institutions’ reports are true, then why are similar criminal reporting requirements 
not imposed on other private actors, such as Facebook, who might just as easily assist 
law enforcement in detecting possible criminal activity? 
To analyze the case for reforming the BSA/AML regulatory regime, this Note 
follows two related lines of inquiry. First, it looks to other mandatory criminal 
reporting laws to derive a framework of normative principles that justify the 
imposition of criminal reporting requirements on private actors.21 These principles 
are then applied to the BSA/AML criminal reporting requirements to argue that a 
policy that almost entirely shifts law enforcement duties to financial institutions is 
not only anomalous but excessive given the law’s reluctance to criminalize failures 
to report crime.22 To further illustrate this point, this Note suggests that the 
government’s same crime-deterrence rationale for imposing strict criminal reporting 
duties under the BSA/AML regulatory regime could seemingly extend to numerous 
other private actors who are equally as likely to encounter criminal activity.23 As part 
of its second line of inquiry, this Note conducts a cost-benefit analysis, weighing the 
major arguments for and against reform of the BSA/AML regulatory scheme, before 
considering how recent proposals to reform the regime could alleviate some of the 
burdens imposed on private institutions.24  
Part I of this Note provides background information outlining the relevant 
BSA/AML laws that establish financial institutions’ affirmative duties to report 
financial crimes. Part II analyzes the contours of other laws that create mandatory 
criminal reporting obligations, including their extent, their underlying justifications, 
and how stringently government agencies enforce them. Part III demonstrates how 
financial institutions’ reporting duties are uniquely stringent and punitive compared 
to those imposed elsewhere in the law, and it questions the justifications of this 
policy. Lastly, Part IV of this Note argues that the BSA/AML regulatory regime 
could be reformed to reduce the costs and duties borne by financial institutions 
without sacrificing the government’s interests in deterring money laundering and 
ensuring national security. To be clear, this Note does not advocate for the 
elimination of BSA/AML reporting duties. Rather, it argues that the current 
BSA/AML regulatory regime would be more consistent with its stated objectives if 
federal policymakers adopted measures that reduce the disproportionate costs and 
perverse incentives discussed in this Note. 
I. THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATORY SCHEME 
Section I.A of this Note first explains how criminals launder illegally gained 
proceeds, and it describes the benefits that they derive from doing so. Next, Section 
 
 
 20. See infra text accompanying notes 233–234. 
 21. See infra Section II.A. 
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. See infra text accompanying notes 263–265 
 24. See infra Section IV.D.  
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I.B traces the historical development of the BSA/AML regulatory regime and 
examines how each major legislative act has expanded financial institutions’ role in 
combating financial crime. Section I.C concludes by defining the several affirmative 
duties imposed on the financial institutions by the regulatory scheme. 
A. Definition of Money Laundering 
Money laundering is the process “by which one conceals the existence, illegal 
source, or illegal application of income, and then disguises that income to make it 
appear legitimate.”25 In other words, it is making illegally gained, or “dirty money,” 
appear “clean.”26 Money laundering generally involves three steps: (1) placement, 
(2) layering, and (3) integration.27 Placement is the most difficult step in which 
money launderers are most vulnerable, as they must find a way to enter large sums 
of cash into the legitimate financial system without drawing the attention of law 
enforcement.28 This is typically accomplished by funneling the money through 
“front” operations (e.g., jewelry stores and check-cashing operations) or converting 
it into negotiable instruments that can be directly deposited into banks (e.g., cashier’s 
checks).29 In the next step, layering, the aim is to create confusion by transferring the 
funds through numerous accounts in a complex series of transactions that make it 
difficult for law enforcement agencies to trace the money’s origins.30 Often, the 
money is wired to accounts in offshore banking havens in countries with strict bank 
secrecy laws, where money launderers can create additional confusion by forming 
“shell” companies that conceal the identity of their beneficial owners.31 The 
anonymity provided by these companies allows money launderers to funnel illegal 
proceeds into these accounts under the guise of a legitimate business.32 Alternatively, 
they may use the value of the offshore accounts as security (or collateral) to take out 
loans in other countries.33 In the final step, integration, the funds reenter the 
mainstream financial system and appear as legal proceeds.34 The personal and 
commercial transactions involved at this stage can range from purchasing luxury 
 
 
 25. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, INTERIM REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING 7 (1984). 
 26. History of Anti-Money Laundering Laws, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, 
https://www.fincen.gov/history-anti-money-laundering-laws [https://perma.cc/W6KZ-SGCJ].  
 27. Id.  
 28. Scott Sultzer, Money Laundering: The Scope of the Problem and Attempts to Combat 
It, 63 TENN. L. REV. 143, 149 (1995). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Kathleen A. Lacey & Barbara Crutchfield George, Crackdown on Money Laundering: 
A Comparative Analysis of the Feasibility and Effectiveness of Domestic and Multilateral 
Policy Reforms, 23 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 263, 268 (2003); History of Anti-Money Laundering 
Laws, supra note 24.  
 31. Sultzer, supra note 28, at 150; see also Lacey & George, supra note 30, at 268 (“The 
beneficial owners of the shell companies are hidden beneath layers of bank secrecy laws and 
the exercise of the attorney-client privilege.”). 
 32. See Leefeldt, supra note 5.  
 33. Sultzer, supra note 28, at 150. 
 34. Lacey & George, supra note 30, at 268. 
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goods to investing in business ventures or various financial instruments.35 Again, the 
end goal is to provide the criminal with access to the proceeds by giving them the 
appearance of legitimacy.36 
B. The Role of Financial Institutions in the Fight Against Money Laundering 
The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (BSA) established the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury’s authority to require financial institutions to record and report their 
customer’s transactions and to assist government agencies in detecting money 
laundering violations.37 Although the BSA does not define the types of reports that 
financial institutions must file or criminalize the act of money laundering itself, it 
serves as an enabling statute that empowers the Secretary of the Treasury to issue 
regulations on the types of reports it expects to collect.38 The goal of the BSA was to 
create a paper trail of financial transactions and records that could be used to 
prosecute the underlying crimes of money laundering (e.g., drug trafficking, tax 
evasion, terrorism).39 For instance, pursuant to the powers conferred by the BSA, the 
Secretary of the Treasury requires Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs) to be filed 
when a domestic financial institution is involved in a payment, receipt, or transfer of 
currency greater than $10,000.40 
In response to financial institutions’ duty to file CTRs, money launderers began 
to divide their transactions into smaller amounts to avoid detection in a process called 
“smurfing” or “structuring.”41 Moreover, many banks, recognizing that the fines for 
not filing CTRs were relatively small and that investigations were rare, exploited 
loopholes in the BSA.42 Federal lawmakers at the time noted the ineffectiveness of 
the BSA in deterring money laundering, and they passed the next major piece of 
AML legislation: The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (MCLA).43 The 
 
 
 35. Alison S. Bachus, From Drugs to Terrorism: The Focus Shifts in the International 
Fight Against Money Laundering After September 11, 2001, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 835, 
845 (2004); see also Sultzer, supra note 28, at 151 (listing some of the different financial 
instruments used by money launderers to integrate illicit funds). 
 36. What Is Money Laundering?, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, 
https://www.fincen.gov/what-money-laundering [https://perma.cc/F36K-PNBZ]. 
 37. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 
(1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.); 
FinCEN’s Mandate from Congress, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, 
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-regulations/fincens-mandate-congress 
[https://perma.cc/J775-KKNW].  
 38. Paul Fagyal, The Anti-Money Laundering Provisions of the Patriot Act: Should They 
Be Allowed to Sunset?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1361, 1370 (2006). 
 39. See 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (2012) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter . . . to require certain 
reports or records where they have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory 
investigations or proceedings, or in the conduct of intelligence or counterintelligence 
activities, including analysis, to protect against international terrorism.”); see also Fagyal, 
supra note 38, at 1370.  
 40. 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.310–.311 (2019). 
 41. Fagyal, supra note 38, at 1374.  
 42. Sultzer, supra note 28, at 158–59. 
 43. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–
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MCLA made both money laundering and structuring crimes in and of themselves, 
and it provided for civil and criminal forfeitures of funds and property involved in 
money laundering.44 An individual convicted of money laundering can face up to 
twenty years in prison and up to a $500,000 fine.45 
The BSA/AML regulatory framework broadened again with the passage of the 
Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992 (“Act”).46 The Act changed 
the role of financial institutions under the BSA/AML regime in two major ways: (1) 
it created the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR);47 and (2) it set forth the minimum 
requirements for financial institutions’ BSA/AML compliance programs.48 The 
effect of the SAR requirement is that the responsibility for determining which reports 
should be filed shifted from the government to the banks,49 as they ultimately decide 
whether or not to file an SAR with FinCEN in response to suspicious activity, and 
they must document the reasons underlying each one of their decisions.50 FinCEN is 
a bureau administered by the U.S. Department of the Treasury that collects 
information about financial transactions to combat money laundering and 
terrorism.51 FinCEN was created in 1990 as an intelligence network designed to 
support the detection, investigation, and prosecution of money laundering crimes.52  
A financial institution is expected to file an SAR with FinCEN when the bank 
knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect that:  
 
 
1957, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1353–1354, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324–5326 (1988)); see also Sultzer, supra note 
26, at 159 (recounting the shortcomings of the BSA that led to the passage of the MCLA). 
 44. Sultzer, supra note 28, at 159. See infra note 194 for a discussion about forfeiture 
actions under the BSA/AML regulatory regime. 
 45. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2012).  
 46. Pub. L. 102-550, 106 Stat. 4044 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
12 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.); see also Fagyal, supra note 38, at 1375–76 (discussing 
how the Act changed the BSA/AML regulatory regime). 
 47. The Act provided the statutory authority for the SAR by authorizing the Secretary of 
the Treasury to require financial institutions “to report any suspicious transaction relevant to 
a possible violation of law or regulation.” 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(1) (2012). Financial institutions 
are expected to file SARs that report their customer’s criminal activities, or their suspicions 
thereof, to FinCEN. See Matthew R. Hall, An Emerging Duty to Report Criminal Conduct: 
Banks, Money Laundering, and the Suspicious Activity Report, 84 KY. L.J. 643, 653–54 
(1995).  
 48. See Fagyal, supra note 38, at 1376–77. See infra text accompanying notes 63 and 64 
for the minimum requirements of financial institutions’ BSA/AML compliance programs. 
 49. Fagyal, supra note 38, at 1376. 
 50. Suspicious Activity Reporting—Overview, FFIEC: BSA/AML MANUAL, 
https://bsaaml.ffiec.gov/manual/RegulatoryRequirements/04 [https://perma.cc/Y2EZ-JQ92]. 
 51. 31 U.S.C. § 310 (2012). Although this Note focuses primarily on the role of the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury and FinCEN in the BSA/AML regulatory regime, there are at least 
six other major policymakers involved in the fight against money laundering: (1) the U.S. 
Department of Justice; (2) the Office of the U.S. Attorney General; (3) the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI); (4) the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA); (5) the Federal Reserve Board; 
and (6) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Sultzer, supra note 28, at 179–80. 
 52. Treas. Order 105-08 (Apr. 25, 1990); Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, supra 
note 1. 
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(i) The transaction involves funds derived from illegal activities or is 
intended or conducted in order to hide or disguise funds or assets derived 
from illegal activities (including, without limitation, the ownership, 
nature, source, location, or control of such funds or assets) as part of a 
plan to violate or evade any law or regulation or to avoid any transaction 
reporting requirement under Federal law;  
(ii) The transaction is designed to evade any regulations promulgated 
under the Bank Secrecy Act; or  
(iii) The transaction has no business or apparent lawful purpose or is not 
the sort in which the particular customer would normally be expected to 
engage, and the institution knows of no reasonable explanation for the 
transaction after examining the available facts, including the background 
and possible purpose of the transaction.53 
The kind of customer conduct that should alert financial institutions of possible 
criminal activity largely depends on a customer’s individual risk profile, which is 
created by a bank when a customer opens an account and is then used as a benchmark 
for identifying unusual transactions.54  
Congress expanded FinCEN’s role in 1994 to include responsibilities for 
administering the BSA.55 Today, the agency’s primary duties are concentrated on 
collecting the CTRs and SARs filed by financial institutions and sharing them with 
partners in the law enforcement community.56 Congress gives FinCEN a broad range 
of other responsibilities as well: the agency analyzes data in support of 
investigations, it exchanges information with foreign financial intelligence unit 
counterparts, it manages data storage to ensure government-wide access, it issues and 
interprets regulations related to combating money laundering, and it enforces 
compliance with those regulations.57  
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Title III of the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“Patriot Act”) included AML provisions that 
broadened the role of financial institutions in exposing terrorist networks.58 First, the 
types of financial institutions required to submit SARs expanded to include casinos, 
insurance companies, brokers and dealers in securities, currency dealers and 
exchangers, jewelers, dealers in precious metals and stones, and mutual funds.59 The 
 
 
 53. 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(c)(4) (2019). 
 54. See infra text accompanying note 72. 
 55. FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 3 (2010).  
 56. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, 
https://www.treasury.gov/about/history/Pages/fincen.aspx (last updated Nov. 13, 2010) 
[https://perma.cc/9A6B-B7FA]. 
 57. 31 U.S.C. § 310(b)(2) (2012); Treas. Order 180-01(3)(a) (July 1, 2014); see also What 
We Do, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/what-we-do 
[https://perma.cc/Z27M-SLFW].  
 58. Fagyal, supra note 38, at 1362. 
 59. Id. at 1378–79; BSA Timeline, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, 
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-and-regulations/bank-secrecy-act/bsa-timeline 
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Patriot Act also assigned the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to add to the list 
of covered institutions any business or agency that is similar to the others already 
included, as well as any others that are useful in criminal, tax, or regulatory matters.60 
In addition, the Patriot Act established the “Know Your Customer” (KYC) laws, 
which require financial institutions to verify the identity of their customers at account 
opening.61 Still in effect today, KYC laws direct financial institutions to, at a 
minimum, implement procedures that are designed to meet the following objectives: 
(A)  verifying the identity of any person seeking to open an account to 
the extent reasonable and practicable;  
(B)  maintaining records of the information used to verify a person's 
identity, including name, address, and other identifying information; and  
(C) consulting lists of known or suspected terrorists or terrorist 
organizations provided to the financial institution by any government 
agency to determine whether a person seeking to open an account 
appears on any such list.62 
C. The CDD Rule: “The Fifth Pillar” of Effective Compliance 
Prior to the passage of the new CDD Rule, an effective BSA/AML compliance 
program had four essential “pillars”:  
(A)  the development of internal policies, procedures, and controls;  
(B)  the designation of a compliance officer;  
(C)  an ongoing employee training program; and  
(D)  an independent audit function to test programs.63  
The CDD Rule, which became effective in July 2018, created a fifth core pillar of 
effective BSA/AML compliance.64  
The CDD Rule’s fifth pillar expects financial institutions to implement risk-based 
procedures for customer due diligence as part of an ongoing duty to monitor their 
customers.65 The duty begins when a customer opens a new account, at which point 
a financial institution must create a customer risk profile that is “used to develop a 
 
 
[https://perma.cc/B7FS-88K8] (providing the list of financial institutions required to file SARs 
has continuously expanded from 2002 until present).  
 60. See 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(Y), (Z) (2012). 
 61. Fagyal, supra note 38, at 1378. 
 62. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(l)(l)–(2) (2012).  
 63. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1)(A)–(D) (2012). 
 64. FinCEN Adds Fifth BSA Compliance “Pillar,” NAT’L CREDIT UNION ADMIN., 
https://www.ncua.gov/newsroom/Pages/ncua-report/2017/second-quarter/fincen-adds-fifth 
-bsa-compliance-pillar.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z4PV-KFZR].  
 65. Id. 
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baseline against which customer activity is assessed for suspicious activity.”66 This 
baseline assists a financial institution in determining whether a customer’s 
“transaction has no business or apparent lawful purpose or is not the sort in which 
the particular customer would normally be expected to engage,” which would trigger 
its duty to file an SAR report.67  
In creating the customer risk profile, a financial institution may rely on the 
information supplied by customers, so long as “it has no knowledge of facts that 
would reasonably call into question the reliability of the information,” although it is 
expected to continuously update that information based “on a risk basis.”68 This risk 
basis should be “event-driven and occur[] as a result of normal monitoring” for 
changes to a customer’s personal information, including beneficial ownership 
information.69 
The CDD Rule also added “legal entity customers” to the list of customers whose 
identities must be verified before a financial institution conducts business with 
them.70 Prior to the CDD Rule, financial institutions were only required to address 
beneficial ownership for owners of private accounts and for accounts related to 
certain foreign financial institutions.71 Financial institutions are now required to 
“identify the beneficial owners of legal entity customer accounts” at the time a new 
account is opened.72 Legal entity customers include corporations, limited liability 
companies, partnerships, and similar domestic and foreign types of businesses.73 
Notably, the verification requirements now extend to “shell” companies,74 which are 
often formed by money launderers for the sole purpose of concealing their identities 
as the account holders.75  
The rule provides three categories of beneficial owners who are covered: (1) any 
persons who, directly or indirectly, have a twenty-five percent or greater stake in the 
legal entity customer; (2) any single person “with significant responsibility to 
control, manage, or direct a legal entity customer” (e.g., the CEO, CFO, General 
Partner, or any other person with similar functions); and (3) the trustee of a trust that 
has greater than a twenty-five percent equity interest in the legal entity customer.76  
 
 
 66. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81 Fed. Reg. 
29,398, 29,398 (May 11, 2016) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, 1024, 1026).  
 67. Suspicious Activity Report, 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(c)(4)(iii) (2019). 
 68. 81 Fed. Reg. at 29,398; see also FinCEN Adds Fifth BSA Compliance “Pillar,” supra 
note 64. 
 69. Customer Due Diligence—Overview, FFIEC: BSA/AML MANUAL, 
https://bsaaml.ffiec.gov/docs/manual/03_RegulatoryRequirements/02.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/FMX3-HZQB]. 
 70. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.230 (2019); see also 81 Fed. Reg. at 29,398 (discussing how 
the rule functions and how it changes financial institutions’ duties). 
 71. Adam S. Coto, Customer Due Diligence: FinCEN and the Beneficial Ownership 
Requirement for Legal Entity Customers, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 145, 146–47 (2016). 
 72. Id. at 146. 
 73. Beneficial Ownership Requirements for Legal Entity Customers—Overview, FFIEC 
BSA/AML MANUAL, https://bsaaml.ffiec.gov/docs/manual/03_RegulatoryRequirements 
/03.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MC3-KT4C]. 
 74. Story, supra note 4. 
 75. See Leefeldt, supra note 5; see also supra text accompanying note 31. 
 76. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.230(d)(1)–(3) (2019). 
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D. Financial Institutions’ Affirmative Criminal Reporting Duties Under the 
BSA/AML Regulatory Regime 
The overarching effect of the AML regulatory framework is that financial 
institutions must fulfill several affirmative duties to conform with FinCEN’s 
expectations and avoid criminal and civil liability. First, by requiring financial 
institutions covered by the regulations to share their suspicions of money laundering 
through SARs and CTRs, Congress has created a duty to report crimes and suspicions 
thereof.77 Secondly, financial institutions have a duty to investigate their customers, 
as the SAR requirement and KYC laws require them to maintain records and conduct 
inquiries into their customers’ identities and businesses.78 Lastly, as a result of the 
new CDD Rule, financial institutions have a third ongoing duty to monitor their 
customers for changes in activity that should be considered suspicious.79  
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR IMPOSING MANDATORY DUTIES TO REPORT CRIMES: 
EXAMINING THE CONTOURS OF CRIMINAL REPORTING LAWS  
Part II of this Note, after establishing that American criminal law generally resists 
imposing affirmative duties to report crimes, analyzes the contours of other laws that 
create mandatory criminal reporting obligations, including their extent, their 
underlying justifications, and their enforcement. From these other laws, Section II.D 
identifies some of the normative principles that justify imposing criminal reporting 
requirements on private actors. This discussion concludes that criminally punishing 
the failure to report crimes does not violate principles of proportionality and fairness 
if, on balance, the burden created by the reporting obligation is low, relative to the 
social good derived from reporting the crime.80 
A. The Law Generally Imposes No Affirmative Duty to Report a Crime 
American law traditionally resists imposing affirmative legal duties to act—a 
byproduct of the common law’s deeply rooted principles of individual liberty and 
autonomy—and similarly resists punishing failures to act with civil or criminal 
punishments.81 Instead, criminal laws generally prohibit the commission of socially 
 
 
 77. See supra text accompanying note 53. 
 78. See supra text accompanying note 62. 
 79. See supra text accompanying note 65. 
 80. See, e.g., Sungyong Kang, In Defense of the “Duty to Report” Crimes, 86 UMKC L. 
REV. 361, 369–70, 375 (2017) (establishing a framework for evaluating a “duty to report”); 
Saperstein et al., supra note 13, at 1 (questioning the effectiveness of the anti-money 
laundering scheme); see also Hearing, supra note 17, at 33 (statement of Heather A. Lowe, 
Legal Counsel and Director of Governmental Affairs, Global Financial Integrity) (“[I]t is 
critical that Congress understands and carefully weighs the potential benefits against the 
potential ramifications that may be negative before making decisions in this area.”). 
 81. Matthew E. Dyson, Always on Duty: Can I Order You to Report Crimes or to 
Intervene?, 224 MIL. L. REV. 176, 181 (2016); Heather Benzmiller, Note, The Cyber-
Samaritans: Exploring Criminal Liability for the “Innocent” Bystanders of Cyberbullying, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. 927, 946 (2013). 
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harmful proscribed acts, creating negative duties not to intentionally make the world 
a worse place.82 Laws creating positive duties, in contrast, tell actors what they must 
do.83 The underlying rationale is that, although not reporting could be considered 
immoral, the proper role of criminal law is not to punish every moral wrongdoing 
irrespective of the harm it causes to society.84 Thus, absent a recognizable duty to act 
at common law (e.g., parent-child relationship),85 a person is not usually criminally 
responsible for what they fail to do.86 
The law has generally extended this approach to criminal reporting requirements, 
imposing no affirmative duty to report a crime.87 For their part, American courts have 
historically found that criminally punishing individuals for omitting to report a crime 
is overly harsh.88 For example, the federal statute for the common law crime of 
“misprision of felony,” 18 U.S.C. § 4, reads: 
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony 
cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon 
as possible make known the same to some judge or other person in civil 
or military authority under the United States, shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.89 
Facially, the statute is capable of punishing anyone with passive knowledge of a 
felony who fails to report it to authorities. However, the federal courts have held that 
the law punishes only those individuals who take positive or affirmative steps to 
 
 
 82. See Dressler, supra note 7, at 979. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Kang, supra note 80, at 362.  
 85. Dressler, supra note 7, at 975–76. Another category of omission liability for special 
duties created by statute—for example, the duty to pay taxes by a set date—also exists in 
American criminal law. Id. at 976–77; see also 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (2012). However, the 
justifications for these types of laws are typically unquestioned, and they do not implicate the 
same issues as BSA/AML criminal reporting laws, which this Note seeks to address. See infra 
Section II.D. To be sure, the crime of failing to file a tax return (established by 26 U.S.C. § 
7203) makes the act of not filing the return a crime itself, but the duty to file the return arises 
regardless of whether an actual or suspected predicate crime has occurred. The information 
provided in the return could very well contain criminal information about its subject, but the 
government’s interest in enforcing the obligation to file a tax return is much broader than 
learning of criminal activity. This aspect largely distinguishes this obligation from even the 
statutes discussed in Section II.C., which require the criminal reporting of oneself to 
authorities for social harms committed by that individual. 
 86. Dressler, supra note 7, at 975. 
 87. Hall, supra note 47, at 643. 
 88. Marbury v. Brooks, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 556, 575–76 (1822) (“It may be the duty of a 
citizen to accuse every offender, and to proclaim every offense which comes to his knowledge; 
but the law which would punish him in every case for not performing this duty is too harsh for 
man.”).  
 89. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2012). 
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conceal a crime.90 Similar state misprision statutes have either been repealed,91 or 
courts have declined to extend their application to mere omissions to report a crime 
to authorities.92 Conceptually, the effect of including an “active concealment” 
requirement in the misprision of felony statute is that it functions like most traditional 
criminal laws—individuals do not have an affirmative duty to come forward with 
their knowledge, but they are not allowed to intentionally act in a way designed to 
prevent authorities from discovering the commission of a crime.93 
B. State and Federal Statutes Creating Individual Criminal Reporting Duties 
Despite the law’s general rejection of a duty to report crimes, various state and 
federal statutes carve out exceptions and create civil and criminal punishments for 
individuals who fail to do so under specific circumstances.94 Indeed, there are 
circumstances in which moral duties to act outweigh the interest in maintaining 
individual liberty, especially when the burden of reporting is relatively low.95 For 
example, a handful of states have enacted laws that require individuals to report the 
commission of specifically enumerated crimes to authorities, creating variants of 
“Bad Samaritan” statutes.96 The crimes that trigger reporting duties under “Bad 
 
 
 90. E.g., United States v. Baumgartner, 581 F. App’x 522, 526 (6th Cir. 2014); Bratton v. 
United States, 73 F.2d 795, 797 (10th Cir. 1934); see also Craig Ehrlich, When Minding Your 
Own Business Means Speaking Up: Criminally Punishing a Corporate Executive for Failing 
to Blow the Whistle on the Illegal Misconduct of a Colleague, 32 J.L. & COM. 255, 268–69 
(2014) (citing various federal and circuit court decisions requiring positive concealment to be 
found guilty under the federal misprision statute).  
 91. Gabriel D.M. Ciociola, Misprision of Felony and Its Progeny, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 697, 
723 (2003) (stating that Louisiana, Maine, and New Jersey have repealed their misprision of 
felony statutes). 
 92. For example, Colorado has a misprision statute in its criminal code, COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 18-8-115 (West 2013), but the Tenth Circuit held that the law imposed no general 
obligation to report a crime, United States v. Zimmerman, 943 F.2d 1204, 1214 (10th Cir. 
1991). Similarly, South Dakota’s and Ohio’s misprision statutes have not been repealed, but 
the crimes are rarely, if ever, charged. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(A) (LexisNexis 2014 
& Supp. 2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-11-12 (2017); see Ciociola, supra note 91, at 726–
30. Courts in a select few states recognize the common law crime of misprision of felony, but 
prosecutors rarely charge individuals with the crime except in extraordinary circumstances. 
See generally Ciociola, supra note 91, at 710–21 (discussing how different state courts have 
addressed the common law crime of misprision of felony). Most of the courts in the select 
states that recognize the crime at common law include a mens rea element or require positive 
acts of concealment. Id. In sum, it can be said that the common law crime of misprision is 
practically nonexistent in American law. Ehrlich, supra note 90, at 268.  
 93. See Ciociola, supra note 91, at 722–23. 
 94. See Hall, supra note 47, at 644. 
 95. Dressler, supra note 7, at 987. 
 96. For example, a Nebraska statute punishes “[a]ny person who has knowledge of the 
theft or loss of explosive materials,” and who does not report it to authorities, with a 
misdemeanor. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1226 (LexisNexis 2015). Although the Nebraska 
statute creates an affirmative duty to take action, and it criminally punishes omissions thereof, 
the only circumstance in which the duty arises is when one knows of the theft or loss of 
explosives. See id. 
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Samaritan” laws are usually limited in their scope to specific acts of violence against 
other individuals.97 Additionally, these laws typically carry light punishments98 and 
require that an individual either witnessed the crime99 or had actual knowledge of the 
offense.100 The statutes’ mens rea requirements help explain why, despite the fact 
that many states have specialized reporting provisions for particular offenses in their 
criminal codes, “Bad Samaritan” laws are not frequently enforced.101 Stricter 
enforcement would be costly, and it would be difficult for a prosecutor to prove that 
a bystander possessed the necessary knowledge or other level of culpability required 
by the statute.102 
Other state laws impose a narrower reporting duty on members of specific 
professions, such as medical care providers and owners of car repair shops, who are 
likely to encounter signs of certain types of harm in their line of work.103 These 
variants of “Bad Samaritan” laws also tend to have minimal penalties for 
noncompliance,104 as well as various mens rea requirements that limit culpability.105  
Another unique quality of these “Bad Samaritan” laws is that punishments for 
violations appear directly related to the severity of the crime witnessed, rather than 
the harm caused by a violator’s inaction. For example, the Michigan statute that 
applies to car garage owners who observe bullet damage to vehicles does not specify 
a punishment.106 In contrast, violations of the Massachusetts reporting law that 
applies to any person who witnesses a sexual assault, murder, manslaughter, or 
 
 
 97. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (LexisNexis 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9.69.100 (West 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2)(a) (West 2005); see also Ciociola, supra 
note 91, at 730–31; Ehrlich, supra note 90, at 268; Benzmiller, supra note 81, at 950–51. 
 98. Benzmiller, supra note 81, at 950–51; see, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-1.6(a) 
(West 2008). 
 99. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (LexisNexis 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9.69.100 (West 2019). 
 100. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1226 (LexisNexis 2015); 3 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 
11-1-5.1 (2002); see also Ciociola, supra note 91, at 731–34 (listing various statutes that 
require individuals to report certain crimes). 
 101. See Ehrlich, supra note 90, at 268; Benzmiller, supra note 91, at 950–51. 
 102. See Dressler, supra note 7, at 982, 985. 
 103. Ciociola, supra note 91, at 730–31 (describing this variant of criminal reporting 
statutes); Ehrlich, supra note 90, at 271–73. 
 104. See, e.g., 25 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453-14(c) (West 2008 & Supp. 2019) (failure 
of medical professional to report an injury sustained in a suspicious or violent manner is 
punishable by a fifty dollar to five hundred dollar fine); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-26-5-1, -2 (West 
2012) (those in charge of car repair shops who do not report evidence that a vehicle was struck 
by a bullet are guilty of a Class C infraction); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.411(c) (West 
2004) (failure by physician or surgeon to report injuries inflicted by violence punishable as a 
misdemeanor). 
 105. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3009 (2018) (creating a duty for 
communications officers to report violations within their knowledge of crimes related to 
eavesdropping); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22(B), (F) (LexisNexis 2014 & Supp. 2019) 
(creating a negligence standard for caregivers who fail to report gunshot or stab wounds or 
injuries caused by suspected domestic violence). 
 106. Id. 
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armed robbery are potentially punishable by a $2500 fine.107 The inaction that gives 
rise to liability under both crimes is ostensibly the same, so it seems that one’s 
culpability is dependent not on a violator’s conduct (or lack thereof), but the 
harmfulness of the crime not reported. 
The most sweeping and stringently enforced statutes impose a duty to report 
crimes against helpless victims—namely, the abuse of children and the elderly.108 
Under federal law, all states must have statutes that designate individuals within 
certain professions as “mandatory reporters” of child abuse.109 Some states also 
include “catch-all” provisions that extend the duty to anyone who develops a 
suspicion of abuse.110 This type of criminal reporting statute requires more than the 
other variations discussed above because, by imposing a duty to report suspicions of 
abuse, the law requires individuals to make difficult, good faith judgments about the 
underlying cause of the harm observed.111 State statutes that similarly require 
individuals to report instances of elder abuse have been modeled after those related 
to child abuse, and both types of reporting laws also extend civil immunity to the 
reporters.112  
Whether or not a person has failed to fulfill his or her duty to report abuse 
resembles a negligence standard, asking if the objective, reasonable person would 
have had cause to believe that abuse occurred.113 To further encourage mandatory 
reporters to share their suspicions, the statutes include good faith immunity clauses 
that protect them in the event that their suspicions are mistaken.114 Thus, although 
mandatory reporters do not have a duty to further investigate their customers, clients, 
 
 
 107. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 268, § 40 (LexisNexis 2010). 
 108. Ciociola, supra note 91, at 731–34; Ehrlich, supra note 90, at 271–72; see, e.g., 320 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 20/4 (West 2018). 
 109. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND 
NEGLECT (2019) (providing information about all states’ mandatory reporting laws).  
 110. Sandra Guerra Thompson, The White-Collar Police Force: “Duty to Report” Statutes 
in Criminal Law Theory, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 3, 11, 15 (2002).  
 111. Suzanne M. Nicholls, Responding to the Cries of the Innocent: Holding Non-
Offending Parents Criminally Responsible for Failing to Protect the Abused Child, 30 T. 
JEFFERSON L. REV. 309, 318 (2007); See Lisa Koverko, Note, Piercing the Veil of Secrecy: The 
Impact of the Child Protection Law on the Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse, 88 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 51, 64 (2010). 
 112. Thompson, supra note 110, at 23. 
 113. See, e.g., OR. ADMIN. R. 413-015-0115(50) (2018) (defining reasonable suspicion); 
see also CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 109, at 3 (“Typically, a report must be 
made when the reporter . . . suspects or has reason to believe that a child has been abused or 
neglected. Another frequently used standard is the requirement to report in situations in which 
the reporter has knowledge of, or observes a child being subjected to, conditions that would 
reasonably result in harm to the child.” (emphasis in original)); Nicholls, supra note 111, at 
318 (“To determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that child abuse is occurring, 
courts use the same standard as that used for permissive reporters—the objective reasonable 
person standing in the reporter's position.”);.  
 114. Nicholls, supra note 111, at 318; Koverko, supra note 111, at 64.  
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or patients,115 the expectation that mandatory reporters will not be negligent in 
observing signs of child abuse creates a duty to discover crime.116  
C. Duties to Report Crimes that Commonly Arise in Specific Industries 
Mandatory criminal reporting laws applicable to specific industries may be 
justified by a governmental interest in preventing systemic crimes within the 
industry.117 Often, the effect of these statutes is to reduce liability or require reporting 
in instances where the actor itself is responsible for the harm.118 Criminal self-
reporting obligations that are imposed on certain industries prominently arise under 
securities laws and environmental laws.119 For instance, under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 
persons in charge of vessels are expected to report a release of hazardous materials 
for which they are responsible.120 Liability under CERCLA for omitting to report a 
spill is limited to “persons in charge,” and the statute’s safe harbor provision extends 
immunity from criminal liability to self-reporters.121 
Another industry-wide reporting requirement mandates that electronic 
communication service providers share the identity, location, and communications 
of individuals who are involved with child pornography to the National Center for 
Missing and Exploited Children.122 Similar to the mens rea requirements found in 
several “Bad Samaritan” laws, violations of the law occur when actors with “actual 
knowledge” of the criminal activity omit to file the required reports.123 To assist the 
electronic communication service providers in their efforts to identify offenders, the 
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children shares its own information, 
including web addresses already known to contain illicit material.124 
 
 
 115. See Andrew Solomon, Preventing Recurrences of the Cover-Ups at Penn State & 
Baylor (and Now Michigan State): Where Does It End?, 28 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 379, 409–
10 (2018). 
 116. Koverko, supra note 111, at 67; see also Solomon, supra note 115. 
 117. See Thompson, supra note 110, at 12. 
 118. Hall, supra note 47, at 646.  
 119. Id. at 647; see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (2012). Unlike the other laws discussed in 
Section II.C., Sarbanes-Oxley requires internal reporting of financial misconduct to the chief 
legal counsel or the chief executive officer of a company. See Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 784 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
7245 (2012)). Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Act is different from the criminal reporting statutes 
for the reason that it encourages, but does not require, reporting. See Section 922 of the Dodd-
Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1841 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
6 (2012 & Supp. V 2018)). 
 120. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2772 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (2012); 
see also Thompson, supra note 110, at 33 (describing the conditions under CERCLA that can 
create criminal liability for failing to report). 
 121. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a). 
 122. 18 U.S.C. § 2258A (2012 & Supp. V 2018). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Kang, supra note 80, at 392. 
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D. A Framework for Understanding When Imposing Affirmative Duties to Report 
Crimes Is Justified 
To address the normative question of when it is acceptable for the government to 
compel criminal reporting, a qualitative and quantitative cost-benefit analysis of 
criminal reporting laws can lend valuable insights into their relative levels of fairness 
and proportionality.125 One commentator, Sungyong Kang, suggests that the proper 
framework for this analysis should consider the moral culpability of the reporter as 
determined by the reporter’s relationship to the crime (i.e., victim, offender, or third 
party).126 Kang also acknowledged that other factors—including the potential 
reporter’s level of knowledge about the crime, the harm caused to the individual 
being reported, and the social good produced by the reporting—also bear on this 
analysis.127 This Section will examine how these factors apply to the mandatory 
criminal reporting laws discussed earlier in Part II to create a benchmark from which 
burdens created by the BSA/AML reporting laws can be examined.  
The affirmative duties that criminal reporting laws create may be justified by a 
societal belief that people in special circumstances should be expected to assist law 
enforcement in preventing crime.128 In carving out exceptions to the law’s general 
rejection of imposing affirmative duties to act, the reporting laws primarily benefit 
society in one of two ways: (1) protecting helpless victims, and (2) preventing 
widespread or systemic harms.129 For example, mandatory reporting laws related to 
child abuse fall in the first category, and the duties are imposed on licensed 
individuals who have already accepted professional duties of care.130 Any additional 
burden borne by reporters is minor relative to the obligations that they already owe 
and the magnitude of harm that can be prevented by the reporting of child abuse.131 
Moreover, due to the discreet nature of the crime, punishing many offenders would 
be much more difficult, if not impossible, but for mandated criminal reporting.132  
The position of the reporter relative to the crime also bears on the potential 
reporter’s level of knowledge about the commission of a crime. Reporters who are 
more certain that a crime occurred and fail to report it are more blameworthy than 
individuals who merely suspect one took place.133 Thus, the mens rea requirements 
in reporting laws can help make the imposition of the affirmative duties more 
 
 
 125. See id. at 370; see also Hearing, supra note 17, at 11 (statement of Heather A. Lowe, 
Legal Counsel and Director of Governmental Affairs, Global Financial Integrity) (“[I]t is 
critical that Congress understands and carefully weighs the potential benefits against the 
potential ramifications that may be negative before making decisions in this area.”); Saperstein 
et al., supra note 13, at 1 (“The optimal level of banking regulation necessarily requires some 
sort of cost-benefit analysis.”). 
 126. Kang, supra note 80, at 378–79. 
 127. Id. at 376–78. 
 128. Arthur Leavens, A Causation Approach to Criminal Omissions, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 
547, 575 (1988). 
 129. Thompson, supra note 110, at 12. 
 130. Id.  
 131. See Hall, supra note 47, at 646.  
 132. See Kang, supra note 80, at 381. 
 133. Id. at 376. 
666 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 95:649 
 
justifiable by limiting who can be held criminally liable to those actors with the 
greatest culpability. For instance, most of the variations of “Bad Samaritan” laws 
discussed in Section II.B require that an individual either witnessed the crime or had 
knowledge of the offense.134 Similarly, the criminal self-reporting statutes applicable 
to business associations are not only justified by the fact that the actors themselves 
are responsible for the harm, but the potential reporters will also have little doubt 
about their own responsibility for the crime committed.135  
Under Kang’s cost-benefit approach, a third factor, the social good created by 
criminal reporting, can be weighed against the burden imposed on the reporter.136 
The social good created by criminal reporting largely depends on the severity of the 
harm that the government seeks to deter,137 which helps to distinguish the varying 
criminal penalties imposed by the “Bad Samaritan” statutes discussed above. The 
mandatory reporting duties related to serious, violent crimes include more stringent 
punishments for omissions, even though the other factors (such as the parties’ 
relationships to the crime and the mens rea requirements) were generally the same.138 
Moreover, the burden created is relatively low under all the criminal reporting laws 
discussed in Part II, as they require no further action after alerting authorities.139   
III. THE EXCEPTIONALLY STRINGENT DUTY TO REPORT CRIME UNDER ANTI-
MONEY LAUNDERING LAWS 
This Note recognizes that private financial institutions may be in a better position 
than government agencies to detect and report money laundering violations,140 as 
they are simultaneously violators, victims, and interested third parties to the crime.141 
As potential violators who stand to profit, financial institutions are incentivized not 
to report financial crimes, which is a factor that supports stricter punishments and 
more stringent enforcement of their reporting duties.142 The government, for its part, 
has an unquestioned interest in preventing the systemic harms created by money 
laundering and terrorist financing—further justifying the imposition of mandatory 
criminal reporting requirements on private actors—but to what extent should this 
 
 
 134. See supra text accompanying notes 96–100. 
 135. See Thompson, supra note 110, at 50. For example, the costs for businesses that self-
report their violations of environmental laws might ultimately be high, as violators are granted 
criminal, but not civil, immunity under CERCLA, but the fact that the reporter bears direct 
responsibility for causing the harm justifies these costs. Id. at 34. Still, even if a potential 
reporter was responsible for an environmental harm, their failure to report may not have caused 
the harm or necessarily even aggravated it. Id. at 6. 
 136. See Kang, supra note 80, at 377. 
 137. See id. 
 138. See supra text accompanying notes 105–106. 
 139. See supra Sections II.B, C. 
 140. See Kang, supra note 80, at 362.  
 141. See id. at 364.  
 142. See Fagyal, supra note 38, at 1371–74 (describing banks’ lax BSA/AML compliance 
in the 1970s and 1980s—an era in which banks actively sought ways to avoid reporting 
requirements in order to continue conducting business with money launderers).  
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practice be allowed?143 Today, federal regulators punish banks even when no money 
laundering violations were found to have occurred.144  
This Note appreciates the severity of the threats that these crimes pose to the 
integrity of the financial system, but it questions the extent to which the 
government’s interest in deterring money laundering can reasonably support creating 
mandatory criminal reporting duties that shift the government’s own law 
enforcement responsibilities to private actors. To address this issue, Part III conducts 
a qualitative and quantitative cost-benefit analysis of the BSA/AML regulatory 
regime.145 This Part focuses first on the qualitative aspects of BSA/AML reporting 
obligations, as well as FinCEN’s stringent enforcement of the regulations and the 
disproportionate punishments for inadequate compliance, which distinguish AML 
criminal reporting duties from the reporting laws discussed in Part II. This Part then 
considers recent quantitative data and studies that suggest the economic costs and 
burdens of compliance incurred by financial institutions are disproportionate to the 
benefits that the law enforcement agencies derive from the current BSA/AML 
regulatory regime. Part III concludes that the burdens created by the reporting duties 
under the current regime have become excessive and are inconsistent with the 
principles discussed in Section II.D. In effect, the AML/BSA regulatory framework 
has turned the industry into an unfunded police force.146 
A. A Qualitative Analysis of the Affirmative Duties Imposed on Financial 
Institutions by AML Laws and Regulations 
As discussed in Section I.D of this Note, the overarching effect of the BSA/AML 
regulatory framework is that financial institutions must fulfill several affirmative 
duties to conform with FinCEN’s expectations and avoid criminal and civil 
liability.147 First, financial institutions have a duty to report crimes, as the BSA/AML 
regulatory regime mandates that they share their suspicions of financial crimes with 
FinCEN by filing SARs and CTRs.148 Secondly, financial institutions have a further 
 
 
 143. This Note maintains that, in some situations, failing to report a crime may be 
inherently wrong, mala in se, and that it is the failure to fulfill a moral duty and causation of 
social harm that justifies criminal, as opposed to just civil, punishment. See Kang, supra note 
80, at 369. Administrative, or regulatory, laws that create civil penalties for violations are 
generally less concerned about the violator’s culpability for the offense, often holding the 
violators strictly liable. See id. Often, such regulatory actions are justified if their benefits 
outweigh their costs. See id. at 369–70 (stating that regulations are often subject to cost-benefit 
analyses); see also Saperstein et al., supra note 13, at 2 (stating that scholars, Congress, and 
courts encourage policymakers to weigh the qualitative and quantitative benefits and costs of 
regulations). Because the AML/BSA regime is a hybrid of criminal and administrative law 
that includes both civil and criminal punishments for inadequate compliance, see infra Section 
III.B, this Section of my Note analyzes financial institutions’ moral culpability for BSA/AML 
violations, as well as the economic costs and benefits of the regime. 
 144. Saperstein et al., supra note 13, at 1. 
 145. See Kang, supra note 80, at 369–70; Saperstein et al., supra note 13, at 1–2; see also 
supra text accompanying note 125.  
 146. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 17, at 1. 
 147. See supra Section I.D. 
 148. See supra Section I.D.  
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duty to investigate, as the KYC regulations require the affected institutions to 
maintain records and conduct inquiries into their customers’ identities.149 Third, 
financial institutions are expected to monitor their customers for changes in activity 
that indicate illegal activity.150 Before discussing how well compliance is enforced 
and the severity of punishments for inadequate compliance, Section III.A analyzes 
how financial institutions’ reporting duties are qualitatively distinct, as financial 
institutions are held criminally liable for failing to serve as effective law enforcement 
agents.  
1. BSA/AML Criminal Reporting Duties Are Uniquely Broad, Ambiguous, and 
Burdensome Compared to Criminal Reporting Duties Found Elsewhere in the Law 
The Patriot Act broadly delegated authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to 
add almost any business to the list of financial institutions expected to comply with 
BSA/AML reporting requirements.151 The result has been that, under the current 
regulatory regime, car dealers, travel agencies, and jewelers may be subject to the 
same liability as major banks for failing to adequately file reports with FinCEN 
without regard for their financial ability to undertake the same compliance 
measures.152 Even if the reporting duties can be justified in part by financial 
institutions’ professional knowledge about the signs of money laundering—in the 
same way that physicians can reasonably be expected to report signs of gunshot 
wounds—the indiscriminate application of the reporting requirements still overlooks 
two other factors. It ignores the proportionality and fairness of this requirement, as 
surely the value of the information that the government hopes to gain from such a 
wide range of actors cannot be of equal value.153 
Moreover, financial institutions’ reporting duties are particularly burdensome in 
light of the fact that their SAR reporting obligations are triggered by a lesser 
evidentiary standard than the laws discussed in Part II.154 For example, unlike 
mandatory reporters who are required to report their “reasonable suspicions” of child 
abuse to authorities,155 financial institutions’ reporting duties may be triggered by 
 
 
 149. See supra Section I.D. 
 150. See supra Section I.D. 
 151. Thompson supra note 110, at 27–28.  
 152. See 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (2012); see also Thompson supra note 110, at 28–29 (noting 
that several of the institutions that are covered by BSA/AML reporting requirements are only 
financial in the sense that they earn revenue, but all are equally required to maintain records 
and file SARs). However, some types of businesses, like car dealerships, which are required 
to file transaction reports pursuant to BSA authority, are not expected to file other types of 
reports, like SARs. Car dealerships, for example, file a Form 8300 for cash payments 
exceeding $10,000. See 26 U.S.C. § 6050I (2012). 
 153. See Hearing, supra note 17, at 11 (statement of Heather A. Lowe, Legal Counsel and 
Director of Governmental Affairs, Global Financial Integrity) (“The second point I really 
wanted to stress here is that AML compliance and reporting is undertaken by a really wide 
range of entities and persons going far beyond the banking sector. . . . [A]ny proposed changes 
being considered should really be looked at in light of that wide range of actors, those types 
of entities and persons.”). 
 154. See supra Sections II.B, C. 
 155. See Thompson, supra note 110, at 16.  
2020]    REFORMING REPORTING DUTIES  669 
 
any suspicion of possible criminal activity.156 Both actors share a duty to “discover” 
crime to some extent,157 and the standards, combined with the threat of criminal 
sanctions, create a strong incentive to report.158 In the context of child abuse, it is 
very likely good public policy to require anyone, especially professionals like 
teachers or doctors, to report their reasonable suspicions, as the victims involved are 
among society’s most vulnerable.159  
The issue with applying a lesser evidentiary standard to financial institutions, 
however, can be explained by the differences in their relationship to the crimes that 
the government seeks to deter. Their reporting duties relate not to the third-party 
victims, but rather to the potential perpetrators who are actively concealing their 
criminal acts from the financial institutions that they hope to defraud.160 The conduct 
that should alert financial institutions of when to file SARs is not often readily 
identifiable,161 as money launderers intentionally structure their deposits in ways that 
are designed to avoid triggering their reporting duties.162 Potential violators include 
not only their customers but also insiders within the financial institution, who all 
deliberately attempt to avoid committing acts that they know could create 
suspicion.163 Compared to mandatory reporters, who are held to a negligence 
standard for failing to recognize and report reasonable suspicions of child abuse,164 
financial institutions’ duty to “discover” crimes seems to be a much more arduous 
task that requires greater attentiveness to comply.165 Moreover, FinCEN   does not 
share its own relevant information with financial institutions to help ease this burden, 
as is the case with the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children and 
electronic communication service providers.166 
In effect, the evidentiary standard that triggers the duty to file an SAR rule is a 
double-edged sword. Financial institutions may require less certainty about the 
validity of their suspicions before reporting, as all possible criminal conduct is 
reportable, but this standard also means that good compliance practices must catch a 
wider array of activity to avoid criminal and civil liability. To illustrate this point, 
the SAR requirement gives financial institutions the power to exercise “prosecutorial 
discretion” in deciding what conduct should be considered “suspicious” and reported 
to FinCEN.167 Even FinCEN has acknowledged that, in certain situations, “a more 
 
 
 156. Id. at 25; see also 12 C.F.R. § 21.11(c) (2018). 
 157. See supra text accompanying note 115–116. 
 158. See Thompson, supra note 110, at 18. 
 159. See id. at 11–13. 
 160. See supra Section I.A. 
 161. See Hall, supra note 47, at 651.  
 162. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
 163. See Thompson, supra note 110, at 24.  
 164. See supra text accompanying note 113. 
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to adopt adequate BSA/AML policies, see infra Section III.B. 
 166. Kang, supra note 80, at 392–93. 
 167. See Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations; Requirement to Report 
Suspicious Transactions, 61 Fed. Reg. 4326, 4329 (Feb. 5, 1996) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 
103, transferred to 31 C.F.R. Ch. X, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,806 (Oct. 26, 2010)); Hall, supra note 
47, at 651. 
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involved judgment may need to be made whether a transaction is suspicious within 
the meaning of the rule.”168 Given the ambiguity, complexity, and perhaps 
subjectivity in the criteria for what should be considered possibly “suspicious” in the 
context of money laundering and financial crimes, the SAR rule renders financial 
institutions liable for exercising poor judgment, at least according to federal 
regulators, about the type of customer conduct that is valuable to law enforcement 
agencies.169  
2. SAR Reports and “Know Your Customer” Regulations Create an Additional 
Burden to Investigate for Crimes 
Financial institutions’ responsibility to file SARs also serves as a useful starting 
point for discussing their additional investigative duties. As noted above, banks are 
authorized to exercise a unique degree of discretion in selecting what kind of 
customer behavior is reportable.170 When a bank is alerted of customer activity that 
deviates from its risk profile on that customer, the bank, not the government, bears 
the responsibility for the additional investigatory work needed to determine whether 
a SAR report should be filed.171 To contrast this additional obligation from the 
criminal reporting requirements found elsewhere in the law, reporters of child abuse, 
for example, owe no additional duty to substantiate the underlying causes of their 
reasonable suspicions after reporting them to authorities.172 Financial institutions’ 
duty to investigate is resource intensive, and as Greg Baer, President of the Clearing 
House Association, has pointed out, it requires the institutions “to investigate [their 
suspicions] like a law enforcement agency.”173 Although this is a task that law 
enforcement is more qualified and better trained to perform, banks’ compliance 
professionals, who often account for a greater portion of a bank’s staff than their loan 
officers, can spend days conducting exhaustive research to process a single SAR 
report.174 
In addition, the “Know Your Customer” laws, which obligate financial 
institutions to perform inquiries into their customers’ records and affairs when they 
open an account, create other investigative duties for financial institutions.175 The 
information gained in the course of performing these duties should ideally inform 
 
 
 168. Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act, 61 Fed. Reg. at 4329. 
 169. See Saperstein et al., supra note 13, at 1. 
 170. See supra text accompanying note 167.  
 171. See Hearing, supra note 17, at 14–15 (statement of Lloyd DeVaux, President and 
Chief Executive Officer, Sunstate Bank).  
 172. See supra text accompanying note 115.  
 173. Hearing, supra note 17, at 18 (statement of Greg Baer, President, The Clearing House 
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History, CLEARING HOUSE, https://www.theclearinghouse.org/about/history [https://perma.cc 
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 174. See Hearing, supra note 17, at 6–7 (statement of Faith Lleva Anderson, Senior Vice 
President and General Counsel, American Airlines Federal Credit Union, on behalf of the 
Credit Union National Association (CUNA)). 
 175. Thompson, supra note 110, at 29; see also supra text accompanying note 66. 
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banks of when a customer’s activities should be considered suspicious and when an 
SAR should be filed.176 And federal regulators have, to a great extent, outsourced 
their own role in this process to the private sector. Compliance requires financial 
institutions to educate their entire staff on the KYC requirements, as the 
responsibility for gathering the necessary information to build customers’ risk 
profiles often falls on the frontline employees who set up bank accounts.177 The 
overall effect of financial institutions’ investigative duties is that they bear 
conflicting responsibilities: they are simultaneously expected to serve as the 
gatekeepers who prevent money launderers from exploiting the financial system, as 
well as the reporters who assist federal agents in creating the paper trail that can be 
used to convict criminals.178  
3. The CDD Rule Imposes Additional Duties to Monitor and Investigate Customers  
Under the new CDD Rule, financial institutions now have an additional duty to 
monitor for criminal activity, as financial institutions’ obligation to “identify and 
verify the identity of beneficial owners of legal entity customers” is ongoing.179 
Compliance with the new rule creates additional investigatory burdens for financial 
institutions since beneficial ownership information is not easily accessed, as no 
statute currently provides for this information to be shared with financial institutions 
by the states in which beneficial owners incorporate their business associations.180 
The ambiguities in the “fifth pillar” of effective BSA/AML compliance, which 
requires financial institutions to implement risk-based procedures for identifying 
changes in customer activity,181 adds to the burden of compliance. For example, to 
update customers’ information on a “risk basis,” some financial institutions have 
taken extreme steps, including constant monitoring of media for adverse stories about 
their customers, to avoid potential liability.182 
B. The Enforcement of Punishments for Failing to Fulfill Affirmative Duties Under 
the BSA/AML Regulatory Regime 
Financial institutions are seemingly punished for their failure to comply with 
FinCEN’s own subjective determinations of what proper compliance looks like, even 
in the instances where there have been no money laundering violations.183 This 
perception of inconsistent enforcement may be due in part to financial institutions’ 
uncertainty in how to fulfill their criminal reporting requirements. For example, as 
discussed earlier in this Note, the ultimate decision of when an SAR report should 
 
 
 176. See supra text accompanying note 67. 
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be filed rests with the financial institutions.184 Unlike the bright-line duty to file 
CTRs, which is triggered by a set monetary threshold, the duty to file SARs is 
dependent on financial institutions’ own judgments on the amount of suspicion that 
customers’ transactions should generate.185  
The bank examination manual, published by the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council (FFIEC) to guide field examiners when assessing the quality 
of banks’ SAR procedures, states that banks “should not be criticized . . . unless the 
failure is significant or accompanied by evidence of bad faith.”186 But these terms 
are undefined, and despite this stated policy, federal agencies may issue cease and 
desist orders, requiring financial institutions to take specific actions to eliminate 
deficiencies in their BSA/AML programs, if there is a significant potential for 
unreported money laundering offenses.187 Financial institutions will consent to these 
cease and desist orders to avoid litigation costs, but if they fail to take the necessary 
corrective actions, the OCC may issue additional orders imposing multimillion dollar 
civil penalties.188 
Moreover, if the U.S. Attorney’s Office files criminal or civil enforcement actions 
against financial institutions, the mens rea standard that must be established requires 
far less than bad faith. Financial institutions and their individual employees can be 
held criminally liable for inadequate compliance,189 but individual employees are 
only culpable for criminal punishments if they are found to have “willfully” violated 
the reporting requirements.190 In contrast, financial institutions are ostensibly held to 
a strict liability standard for inadequate compliance under the criminal penalty 
statute.191 After announcing charges, federal prosecutors usually opt for deferred 
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prosecution agreements,192 which will also include large civil penalties193 and 
forfeiture actions.194 When financial institutions have implemented effective 
compliance programs, insofar that no actual money laundering offenses or other 
crimes were uncovered, they are not necessarily shielded from liability under 
BSA/AML regulations.195 
The severity of the penalties for inadequate compliance is perhaps the factor that 
most distinguishes the BSA/AML regime from other criminal reporting requirements 
found elsewhere in the law. This Note provided a few examples of the draconian civil 
and criminal fines in its Introduction,196 but to give yet another example of the harsh 
penalties for insufficient compliance, Citibank was forced to pay a $70 million 
penalty in January 2018 for failing to improve its AML program as mandated in a 
2012 consent order.197 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), a 
bureau within the U.S. Department of the Treasury tasked with supervising banks,198 
cited the bank’s incomplete identification of high-risk customers, inadequate 
customer due diligence, and failure to file timely SARs.199 Additionally, the 
maximum civil penalties for inadequate BSA/AML compliance increased following 
the passage of the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Improvements Act of 
2015.200 The government’s rationale for this increase—that fines had not kept pace 
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with the rate of inflation—is ironic considering law enforcement’s resistance to 
similar increases in the monetary thresholds that trigger banks’ reporting 
requirements.201 Based on the formula used in the regulations, the civil penalties for 
BSA/AML violations have doubled or nearly doubled.202  
C. Data & Studies Suggest that the BSA/AML Regime Is Ineffective and Inefficient 
in Deterring Money Laundering  
The benefits that the government derives from such strictly enforced criminal 
reporting requirements seem to be far out of proportion to the costs incurred by 
financial institutions. In 2017, over two million SARs were filed,203 and eighty 
percent of CTRs filed were for monetary amounts below $30,000.204 Due to the 
volume of reports received, federal law enforcement agencies are unable to read a 
vast majority of the CTRs and SARs filed, yet policymakers have not reduced the 
scope of financial institutions’ reporting obligations in accordance with the 
diminishing utility of the high volume of reports that they receive.205 Rather than 
reducing the number of reports that are filed, financial institutions can instead flag 
high-value SARs, called “super SARs,” which require the additional step of taking 
the report into the offices of federal law enforcement agencies, thereby signaling that 
the customer conduct necessitating the report is unusually suspicious.206 
Despite FinCEN’s steadfast and continued insistence on maintaining the current 
BSA/AML regime,207 financial institutions have spent a growing amount of money 
on regulatory compliance and have filed an increasing number of SARs only as 
defensive measures to avoid becoming subject to enforcement actions.208 U.S. firms 
spend on average $25.3 billion per year on AML compliance efforts.209 Financial 
institutions dedicate a significant portion of this amount toward fulfilling their duties 
to verify their customers and assess the risks that they pose—spending as much as 
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$500 million per year to comply with KYC provisions of the BSA/AML regime.210 
The addition of the new CDD Rule will compound this issue, as FinCEN has 
predicted that the additional CDD requirements will cost financial institutions 
between $1.15 billion and $2.15 billion to comply over a ten-year period.211  
For some smaller financial institutions, BSA/AML compliance costs amount to 
ten percent of their total expenses, resulting in organizational structures in which 
more bank’s staff members are dedicated to compliance efforts than its actual 
banking operations.212 These costs will not be borne entirely by the financial 
institutions either, as the portions of their budgets dedicated to BSA/AML 
compliance will no longer be available for providing loans and other services, and 
the costs will be further passed on to customers through higher fees and rates.213 To 
explain how high compliance costs directly hinder banks’ ability to perform their 
primary business functions, Lloyd DeVaux, the President and Chief Executive 
Officer of Sunstate Bank, testified at a congressional hearing in 2017 that “[e]very 
$100,000 spent on compliance translates to a million dollars less that we can lend.”214 
Economically disadvantaged customers are particularly harmed as a consequence 
of the costs and perverse incentives produced by the current AML regime. Banks, in 
a practice known as “derisking,” are reluctant to conduct business with customers 
with ties to countries that they perceive to be more risky out of their fear of 
enforcement actions.215 For example, Banamex USA, the Citigroup subsidiary bank 
currently being dissolved following civil penalties for inadequate BSA/AML 
compliance, was originally acquired by Citigroup in 2001 to improve the bank’s 
access to Mexico’s market by connecting Mexican immigrants working in the United 
States who needed to send money to their relatives at home.216 The issue is that many 
of these innocent cash transfers are large enough to trigger financial institutions’ 
BSA/AML reporting duties, although they are obviously not of the kind that FinCEN 
hopes to uncover.217 Customers from other countries, such as Somalia, who also hope 
to send money home, have been subject to the same disparate treatment due to the 
perverse incentives created by the regime.218 
 
 
 210. John Callahan, Know Your Customer (KYC) Will Be a Great Thing When It Works, 
FORBES (July 10, 2018, 7:15 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/07 
/10/know-your-customer-kyc-will-be-a-great-thing-when-it-works/#203558d38dbb 
[https://perma.cc/2S42-K88D].  
 211. Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81 Fed. Reg. 
29,398, 29,432 (May 11, 2016) (codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1020, 1030, 1024, and 1026); 
see also Coto, supra note 71, at 161 (accounting for IT costs, some estimates put compliance 
costs as high $2 billion per firm, while FinCEN calculated an “‘improbably large’ upper 
boundary of $10 billion”).  
 212. Hearing, supra note 17, at 10 (statement of Lloyd DeVaux, President and Chief 
Executive Officer, Sunstate Bank).  
 213. Saperstein et al., supra note 13, at 8. 
 214. Hearing, supra note 17, at 10 (statement of Lloyd DeVaux, President and Chief 
Executive Officer, Sunstate Bank).  
 215. Saperstein et al., supra note 13, at 5–6.  
 216. Corkery & Protess, supra note 12. 
 217. See Saperstein et al., supra note 13, at 6. 
 218. Id. 
676 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 95:649 
 
IV. THE CASE FOR REFORM: HOW RECENTLY PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
COULD BALANCE THE COSTS IMPOSED BY THE BSA/AML REGULATORY REGIME 
Part IV builds upon Part III by analyzing the ways in which reforming the 
regulatory scheme could reduce the excessive burdens imposed on financial 
institutions without compromising the federal government’s law enforcement and 
national security interests. Although the financial-service industry has consistently 
lobbied for less stringent reporting requirements, its public opposition to the 
expansion of AML reporting requirements was largely muted after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, as many in the industry feared that opposition to the 
additional AML regulations would appear unpatriotic.219 More recently though, 
members of Congress and other policymakers have appeared more sympathetic 
toward financial institutions’ longstanding complaints, as proposed legislation that 
would reform the current BSA/AML regulatory regime has received bipartisan 
support.220 
This Part first considers the financial industry’s major criticisms of their reporting 
duties, as well as the responses of federal regulators who continue to express their 
unwavering belief in the value of the information that financial institutions are 
required to share.221 Next, this Part examines viable options for reform—some of 
which are currently included in bills before Congress.222 
A. Financial Institutions Seek Greater Efficiency, Clarity, and Feedback Under 
AML Regulations 
Recent criticisms from leaders in the financial system suggest that the reporting 
requirements under the current AML regime fail to efficiently fulfill their intended 
purposes. The Clearing House Association (“The Clearing House”) has been at the 
forefront of this criticism.223 In February 2017, The Clearing House published a 
comprehensive report, A New Paradigm, that suggested areas in the BSA/AML 
framework in need of immediate reform.224 One fundamental problem the association 
has identified is the lack of feedback made available to institutions about the utility 
and effectiveness of the information they provide.225 Financial institutions have 
expressed their collective frustrations about this lack of transparency, as they have 
been forced to carefully reevaluate their AML compliance practices, at their own 
expense, in response to recent enforcement actions for inadequate compliance, which 
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are brought in a seemingly inconsistent and unpredictable fashion.226 Given the lack 
of guidance on the kind of customer activity that should generate SAR reports,227 
leaders in the banking industry believe that greater feedback on the value of their 
reports will allow financial institutions to more efficiently identify and prioritize the 
activity that federal agents find the most helpful in catching criminals.228 
In connection with the agency’s efforts to provide more feedback and greater 
transparency to financial institutions, FinCEN provides case examples on its website 
that partially illuminate how federal agencies use the reports filed pursuant to AML 
regulations in enforcement actions.229 But the agency still does not provide data on 
how many SARs sent by financial institutions are actually reviewed by government 
authorities or ultimately lead to arrests.230 Although FinCEN committed to reviewing 
the efficiency of the BSA/AML regulatory scheme in 2007,231 the penalties levied 
against banks for inadequate BSA/AML compliance soared during the Obama 
administration, and the trend of more enforcement actions and higher penalties 
appears to have survived the change in administrations.232 Under the Trump 
administration, FinCEN has continued to maintain that the reports received from 
financial institutions are indispensable to combating money laundering and terrorist 
financing because they reveal personal information, previously unknown addresses, 
business associations, banking and travel habits, and communication methods of 
suspects.233 At the National Anti-Money Laundering Conference & Expo in August 
2018, FinCEN Director Kenneth Blanco reaffirmed the value of the information 
provided by financial institutions, emphasizing that 149 SAR review teams analyze 
BSA/AML data on behalf of 500 law enforcement agencies that regularly make 
queries into the database.234 
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Still, leaders in the industry have increasingly complained that the reports filed 
pursuant to BSA/AML regulations, particularly SARs, are not an efficient 
mechanism for supporting law enforcement agencies’ efforts to combat money 
laundering. The unpredictability of enforcement actions has incentivized covered 
institutions to overreport their customers’ suspicious activities in order to minimize 
the risk of facing penalties for inadequate compliance.235 Further, banking officials 
feel that their professional knowledge about money laundering offenses no longer 
justifies their performance of additional investigatory duties on behalf of law 
enforcement.236 Instead, financial institutions are willing to turn over bulk data to 
federal agencies, which can use advanced data analytics to sift through the 
information just as efficiently.237 This solution could reduce regulators’ reliance on 
criminal reporting by shifting the responsibility for discovering bad actors back to 
the government. 
B. Federal Policymakers Should Adopt BSA/AML Regulatory Reform Measures 
that Balance the Public and Private Sectors’ Responsibilities for Combating 
Financial Crime 
Introduced to Congress in June 2018, the Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance 
Act (“CTIFA”) aimed to increase the dollar thresholds that trigger reporting duties, 
allow greater information sharing between financial institutions, and give FinCEN 
the authority to issue “no-action letters” in response to a financial institution’s 
inquiry about the applicability of BSA/AML regulations.238 CTIFA died in the U.S. 
House of Representatives at the end of the 115th Congress’s session,239 but 
proponents of the bill hoped that updating the reporting thresholds would lessen the 
compliance burden imposed by the BSA/AML regulatory regime by reducing the 
volume of SARs and CTRs that must be filed.240 Opponents, including some federal 
agents who rely on CTRs and SARs in their criminal investigations, resisted the 
proposed increased thresholds. For example, Steven D’Antuono, the Section Chief 
of the FBI’s Criminal Investigation Unit, pointed to terrorists’ frequent use of small-
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Affairs Committee in November 2018.241 Section Chief D’Antuono noted that eighty 
percent of the CTRs filed were for dollar amounts below $30,000 in 2017, but he 
provided at least some examples of CTRs filed in response to small-dollar 
transactions that resulted in important investigations and prosecutions for terrorism 
and other crimes.242 However, as Congressmen Blaine Luetkemeyer and Steve 
Pearce pointed out, the current $10,000 threshold that triggers CTR reporting 
duties243 was set in 1970 and is equal to more than $60,000 when measured in today’s 
dollars.244 The proponents of the CTIFA maintained that, by raising the dollar 
amount to $30,000, the government’s law enforcement interests would be largely 
maintained, as federal regulators would no longer be forced to examine countless 
reports with no connection to money laundering offenses or other crimes.245 
Further, the CTIFA, by extending the current safe harbor provisions to those who 
adopt new compliance technologies, 246  would have reduced future costs of effective 
compliance by encouraging innovative ways to catch money laundering offenses. 
The caveat to this provision is that it would have cut againsthe adoption of another 
proposed solution, which is for the government to rely on modern technology to 
develop resources of its own that mine financial data for evidence of money 
laundering offenses.247 However, assuming that financial institutions’ relationship to 
the crime of money laundering continues to justify the imposition of some reporting 
requirement, new technologies and software programs that use data analytics and 
other advanced metrics would allow institutions to meet their compliance objectives 
at lower costs.248 These technologies, which would primarily rely on algorithms 
produced by big data and artificial intelligence, would still necessitate more detailed 
feedback from FinCEN on the effectiveness of SAR reports in order to effectively 
and more efficiently identify the transactions that are of the most value to federal law 
enforcement agents.249 
But if federal policymakers are unwilling to expand the current safe harbors, as 
the CTIFA proposed, the laws can be amended in other ways that would incentivize 
the innovation of new methods for detecting money laundering offenses. One 
commentator, Cory Howard, has suggested that the BSA/AML regime could include 
a “broad affirmative defense that would shield financial institutions from regulatory 
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enforcement actions in certain situations.”250 The “BSA/AML affirmative defense” 
would reduce the punitive nature of the regulatory regime’s strict-liability standards 
and lessen the appearance of subjectivity in how FinCEN evaluates compliance 
programs.251 But in order for it to apply, financial institutions would be required to 
establish that they conduct routine maintenance on their compliance programs and 
report shortcomings to the appropriate regulatory body when they are discovered.252 
Because the BSA/AML affirmative defense would be unavailable to financial 
institutions that fail to undertake these measures, the law would likely encourage 
greater investment in compliance systems and personnel.253 Thus, the additional 
requirements might not reduce compliance costs, but they would encourage greater 
cooperation and transparency between financial institutions and law enforcement 
agencies.254  
One notable shortcoming in the CTIFA was the absence of a beneficial ownership 
provision that would decrease the additional costs and burdens imposed on financial 
institutions by the CDD Rule. For instance, The Clearing House has expressed 
support for a statute that would require states to record the beneficial ownership of 
the legal entities that incorporate under their laws and that would be available to 
financial institutions.255 The Corporate Transparency Act of 2017256 would have 
responded to this request by requiring “an entity that forms a corporation or limited 
liability company to disclose information about its beneficial owners.”257 If the state 
of incorporation did not require this information by law, then the entity must have 
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directly filed the information with FinCEN.258 This provision, although originally 
included as part of the CTIFA, was later stripped from the revised version of the bill 
that appeared before Congress.259  
The Corporate Transparency Act of 2017’s successor, the Corporate 
Transparency Act of 2019 (CTA), reintroduced the beneficial ownership requirement 
to Congress, but the bill died in the Senate after it was passed in the House of 
Representatives.260 Had it been enacted, the CTA would have made it more difficult 
for underlying bad actors to hide behind a veil of corporate secrecy by requiring 
companies to annually file with FinCEN a list of its current beneficial owners and 
any changes in beneficial ownership that occurred during the previous year.261 The 
CTA allocates the responsibility for collecting and maintaining this data to FinCEN, 
which will provide the information to financial institutions complying with their 
“know your customer” obligations.262 
CONCLUSION 
The normative questions this Note seeks to address, whether financial institutions 
should be subject to criminal reporting requirements, and to what extent, demand a 
closer examination of financial institutions’ relationship to the crime of money 
laundering. Although the government’s interest in deterring money laundering 
deserves fair consideration, and financial institutions undoubtedly should bear some 
responsibility for ensuring that they do not profit from criminals who exploit the 
nation’s financial system, this Note argues that financial institutions’ duties under 
the BSA/AML regulatory regime should be reformed to limit the extent that federal 
agencies can outsource their own law enforcement duties to private actors. 
One can point to other actors who, like financial institutions, have unique 
relationships to certain crimes in that they can be considered violators, victims, or 
interested third parties to the crimes. For example, criminals often use social media 
platforms like Twitter and Facebook to plan and organize serious criminal acts, yet 
the actors who own and operate these platforms currently have no affirmative duties 
to investigate their customers for criminal activity or to report their knowledge 
thereof to authorities.263 Indeed, under the current trend of expanding criminal 
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reporting duties,264 it would seem logical to continue to broaden the scope of both 
the actors legally required to report crimes and the types of crimes that they are 
required to report. Under the same crime-deterrence rationale used to justify the 
BSA/AML regulatory scheme, cell phone companies and internet service providers 
could also be mandated to perform the same affirmative duties.265 The information 
that these private actors could share would surely be highly valuable to law 
enforcement agencies, but the question, of course, becomes: to what extent can 
private actors be deputized to serve as the eyes and ears of law enforcement before 
such policies should be rejected for their inconsistency with accepted principles of 
American law?  
This Note concludes that such policies violate notions of fairness and 
proportionality when the burdens imposed on private actors outweigh their overall 
benefits to society. Although financial institutions should bear some burden, the 
proper extent of their criminal reporting duties could be resolved in part by 
conducting a qualitative and quantitative cost-benefit analysis. By implementing 
some of the reform measures discussed in this Note,266 the burdens would be more 
equally shared by the public and private sectors. 
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